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Abstract  
We employ a dynamic investment model to study the investment incentives of 
the Allowance for Growth and Investment (AGI) proposed by the European 
Commission in its two-step approach towards the Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). We show that the AGI strengthens investment 
incentives in high-tax countries and decreases the CCCTB-induced investment 
push towards low-tax countries. Furthermore, we show that the AGI decreases 
tax competition and that a sufficiently generous AGI reduces tax competition 
between countries when introduced with the CCCTB. We also provide new 
results for the standard Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) discussed 
intensively in the literature. In particular, we show that the ACE reduces the 
CCCTB-induced investment push towards low-tax countries and that the ACE 
reduces tax competition between countries. Despite the positive implications of 
the AGI for investment incentives and tax competition, the ACE performs 
slightly better in both respects. In addition the ACE also offers better neutrality 
properties. On the other hand, the ACE is criticized for its possible inherent tax 
revenue losses; with AGI these losses would be smaller. However, the trade-off 
between better incentives and higher revenue loss also appears to persist with the 
AGI. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has taken an active role in the fight against the tax avoidance 
behavior of multinational enterprises (MNEs). One major specific proposal designed to 
restrain this activity1 was made by the European Commission (EC) on 25 October 2016.2 
This proposal concerns a move to a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
where the tax base definitions are aligned within the European countries and the 
allocation of each corporate group-level tax base is made across countries by a formulary 
apportionment, which in turn is based on three factors (labor, assets, sales) that are 
considered to reflect the location where the corporate activity actually takes place. The 
CCCTB is a variant of formula apportionment (FA), which has been used for decades in 
several federal states such as Canada, Germany and the USA, but not at the EU level.3 
The CCCTB proposal comes with two specific features designed to boost the European 
economy: an allowance for growth and investment (AGI) and a super deduction for 
research and development (R&D) expenses, which are included in the first step towards 
CCCTB, the CCTB.4 We focus in this paper on the implications of the AGI allowance. In 
more detail, we study the effects of an allowance for corporate equity as an element in an 
FA system, with the AGI being a special case of this. To our knowledge this is the first 
detailed study on the effects of the AGI. 
The AGI, which is specified in the first step towards the CCCTB, can be considered a 
modification of the well-known Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE), where not only the 
debt expenses but also the notional costs related to the equity of a company are 
deductible for tax purposes.5 An important benefit of the ACE is that it removes the debt-
equity bias (or debt bias), which refers to asymmetric tax treatment between investments 
made by debt-financing versus those made by equity-financing.6 However, unlike an 
ACE, which provides the allowance based on the overall equity stock of a company, the 
AGI allowance is based on the equity accumulated over the last 10 years only.7 Due to its 
incremental nature and the limited base accumulation period, the AGI may receive wider 
support from the EU member states than the ACE, which has been criticized for its large 
tax revenue losses, which may have to be financed by corporate tax rate increases.8 In 
                                                          
1
 Another objective of the proposal is to strengthen the single market. 
2
 See EC (2016 a,b). 
3
 See e.g. Eichner and Runkel (2008). 
4
 According to the EC proposals, the CCCTB will be implemented in two steps, where the CCCTB proposal is 
preceded by a proposal for a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB). For details, see EC (2016a, b). These 
proposals are based on an earlier EC proposal on the CCCTB, which did not include the AGI, see EC (2011). 
5
 The ACE was developed by the IFS working group (1991) and later on it was included in the tax reform 
proposal by the Mirrlees Review (2011). 
6
 The literature acknowledges that the debt bias increases the ability of MNEs to shift profits, distorts the 
financial choice of investments, and increases systemic risk (see e.g. Fatica et al. 2012). De Mooij and 
Devereux (2009, 2011) and Brekke et al. (2017) provide comparisons between the ACE and the other 
competing solution for the debt-equity bias, the Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT). 
7
 The two common types of ACE implementations (implemented in Belgium and Italy) are compared in 
Zangari (2014). Whereas the Belgian implementation grants an allowance for the entire existing stock of 
equity, the Italian (incremental) implementation grants an allowance only for equity accumulated after the 
reform.  
8
 For the early discussion on the need for corporate tax rate increases to compensate the tax revenue loss 
arising from introduction of the ACE, see Bond (2000). The more recent discussion in the Mirrlees Review 
(Ch. 10; Griffith et al. 2010) argues that there is no need for tax rate increases after the introduction of the 
ACE in the long run, the reason being increased domestic and inbound investments. It also argues that in 
the short and medium term the tax revenue losses would remain small if the ACE allowance were granted 
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our study we consider the differences between the AGI and the ACE. The main features 
of the AGI are given in Box 1. 
Box 1. The Allowance for Growth and Investment (AGI) in a nutshell 
The Allowance for Growth and Investment (AGI) is defined in the Proposal for a Council Directive 
on a Common Corporate Tax Base, COM(2016) 685 final, Strasbourg, 25.10.2016 (EC 2016a). 
According to the proposal, the aim of the allowance is to tackle the debt bias, which refers to an 
advantage in favor of financing through debt as opposed to equity. The allowance is granted to 
companies according to increases or decreases in their equity within the last 10 years (see 
paragraph 4 in Article 11 in the proposal, given below). The equity is defined to include, for the 
purpose of the Article, the ‘capital and reserves’ defined in EU legislation and the ‘equity’ defined 
in International Financial Reporting Standards (see paragraph 2 below). The defined yield (AGI 
rate) is defined to be the yield of the euro area 10-year government benchmark bond increased by 
a risk premium of two percentage points, but at least two per cent (see paragraphs 3 and 5). 
Article 11 
Allowance for growth and investment (‘AGI’) 
“1. For the purposes of this Article, 'AGI equity base' means, in a given tax year, the difference 
between the equity of a taxpayer and the tax value of its participation in the capital of associated 
enterprises as referred to in Article 56.” 
“2. For the purposes of this Article, 'equity' means any of the following: 
(a) 'capital and reserves', as described in letter A., under 'Capital, reserves and liabilities' in Annex 
III to Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 24. 
(b) 'capital and reserves', as described in letter L. in Annex IV to Directive 2013/34/EU;  
(c) 'equity', as defined in the International Financial Reporting Standards which are adopted and 
used in the Union pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council 25.” 
 “3. An amount equal to the defined yield on the AGI equity base increases shall be deductible 
from the taxable base of a taxpayer according to paragraphs 1 to 6. If there is an AGI equity base 
decrease, an amount equal to the defined yield on the AGI equity base decrease shall become 
taxable.” 
“4. AGI equity base increases or decreases shall be calculated, for the first ten tax years that a 
taxpayer is subject to the rules of this Directive, as the difference between its AGI equity base at 
the end of the relevant tax year and its AGI equity base on the first day of the first tax year under 
the rules of this Directive. After the first ten tax years, the reference to the amount of AGI equity 
base that shall be deductible against the AGI equity base at the end of the relevant tax year shall 
annually be moved forward by one tax year.” 
“5. The defined yield referred to in paragraph 3 shall be equal to the yield of the euro area 10-year 
government benchmark bond in December of the year preceding the relevant tax year, as 
published by the European Central Bank, increased by a risk premium of two percentage points. 
A floor of two per cent shall apply where the curve of the annual yield is negative.” 
“6. …” 
Tax systems where the local profits of a multinational enterprise are first pooled and 
then allocated to jurisdictions according to a given formula - FA tax systems - have been 
studied quite intensively. This literature has shown that while FA eliminates the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
only for additions to the equity base, and not to existing equity accumulated before the reform (i.e. no 
windfalls). In addition to this incremental transition rule, the AGI also includes a 10-year time limit for the 
accumulation of the base for the allowance. This limit is likely to further reduce the need for tax rate 
compensation due to possible tax revenue losses. 
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opportunities for profit-shifting between countries participating in an FA system, it 
provides incentives to choose strategically the allocation of factors determining the 
apportionment.9 Thus FA may favor low-tax jurisdictions at the expense of high-tax 
jurisdictions. Regarding tax competition, the literature acknowledges that FA provides 
incentives to lower corporate tax rates, and that the intensity of tax competition depends 
on the mobility of the factors determining the apportionment.10  
To our knowledge, previous literature on the topics that we aim to address is very scarce. 
We have not found any previous academic papers modeling the effects of an AGI-type 
allowance.11 Nor have we found any analyses on the implications of more general equity 
allowances (such as the ACE) as an element in an FA system. In our analysis we use a 
genuinely dynamic framework to study the effects of the AGI on the investment 
incentives of companies under FA. The previous literature on FA has mostly used a static 
framework.12 With a few notable exceptions, the same applies to studies on the ACE.13 
Our dynamic approach allows us to model the accumulation of a time-constrained AGI 
base and the interactions between the AGI and fiscal depreciation allowances, which 
would both remain beyond the scope of a static model. 
In the first part of the paper, we derive the results concerning the investment effects of 
the AGI in the framework of both separate accounting (SA) and FA.14 The results allow for 
several types of comparisons: we compare the current CCCTB proposal with an AGI to 
the earlier CCCTB proposal introduced in 2011, which did not include any equity 
allowance. We compare the AGI to the ACE in the framework of an FA and, finally, we 
study the effects of the replacement of the CCTB (AGI in SA) with the CCCTB (AGI in FA). 
We find that the introduction of the AGI, as specified in the CCCTB proposal, decreases 
the cost of capital in high-tax countries and hence makes the current CCCTB proposal 
more lucrative for investments in these countries than the earlier CCCTB proposal with 
no equity allowance. A comparison between the AGI and the ACE shows that they 
provide very similar investment incentives and the differences are quite small. However, 
even if the differences remain small, the ACE is able to deal with tax distortions better 
than the AGI, in which the cost of capital remains dependent on the parameter values, 
such as the rate of depreciation. Thus the AGI does not have the desirable neutrality 
properties, which are the key benefit of the ACE. The differences between the 
implications of the AGI and the ACE become even more pronounced if the accumulation 
period of the AGI base is less than 10 years, since in that case, for instance, 
depreciations would not erode the AGI base as much.  
                                                          
9
 Under FA, a firm’s tax payment to a given jurisdiction is based on how separate factors given in the formula 
for apportionment, like assets, labor and sales, are allocated to the jurisdiction relative to other jurisdictions 
within the FA. See McLure (1980), Gordon and Wilson (1986), Mintz and Weiner (2003) and Runkel and 
Schjelderup (2011). 
10
 See Gordon and Wilson (1986), Pethig and Wagener (2007), Wrede (2009) and Nielsen et al. (2010). 
11
 For papers discussing some aspects of the AGI, see Rose (2017), The Commission staff working document - 
the Impact Assessment - accompanying the CCCTB proposal (EC 2016c) and Petutschnig and Rünger (2017): 
The latter paper studies empirically the effects of Austria’s former equity allowance which had some 
similarities with the AGI.  
12
 E.g. Mintz and Weiner (2003) and Nielsen et al. (2010). 
13
 The exceptions include Bond and Devereux (1995, 2003). 
14
 Note that the AGI in a SA corresponds to the CCTB tax system, which is the first step towards the CCCTB. 
Note also that it is possible that the CCTB might become effective before the CCCTB. 
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In the second part of the paper we study how the AGI affects the strategic responses by 
countries to other countries’ decisions. We find that the AGI reduces tax competition 
between countries in FA. This reduction is, however, slightly smaller than what the ACE 
would imply. We also find that a replacement of the current SA with no allowance for 
corporate equity by a CCCTB system with an AGI might result in a reduction or an 
increase in tax competition. The sign of the effect depends on the generosity of the AGI 
allowance. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides the details of our investment 
model and derives the optimality conditions for investment decisions. Section 3 
illustrates the magnitudes of the investment incentives resulting from the AGI. It 
compares the investment incentives in FA between the AGI, the ACE and the case with 
no allowance for corporate equity, by providing calculations with varying parameter 
values. Section 4 studies the effects of the AGI on strategic interaction between 
countries. Section 5 provides a discussion. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Modelling the AGI in a dynamic investment framework 
This section employs a dynamic investment model to study the investment incentives 
provided by the AGI in both the CCTB/SA and CCCTB/FA15 tax systems.16 We employ a 
model where an MNE is composed of two companies, each of which operates in a small 
open economy. The parent company of the group is domiciled in country 1 (with 
corporate income tax rate 𝜏1) and its fully-owned subsidiary in country 2 (tax rate 𝜏2 ≤
𝜏1). Both companies have business operations only in their countries of domicile. The 
model is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: A Two-Country Investment Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 In the following sections dealing with investment incentives and tax competition we follow the terminology 
used in most of the earlier literature and stick to the terms SA and FA. However, note that we focus on an 
SA/FA that includes in particular the AGI, an essential feature of the CCTB/CCCTB. The results for the 
SA/FA without the AGI follow from our model as special cases. 
16
 We consider here a continuous-time model. Note that Article 11 in the draft directive employs discrete time 
(e.g. the equity included in the AGI base is determined at the end of each year). Therefore, our model does 
not take into account, for example, possible back-and-forth investments taking place within a year. Nor do 
we consider transition period issues, returns on own equity (equity transition from subsidiary to parent or 
from parent to shareholder), or debt-financing. We use the cost of capital as a measure for investment 
incentives. Other measures employed in the literature include the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) and the 
effective average tax rate (EATR) (see Devereux and Griffith 2003 and references therein). 
𝜋 𝐾2 ,  𝑄2, 
𝐼2,  𝜏2  
SUBSIDIARY 
Shareholder 
Dividends (𝐷2) 
New equity, (𝑄2) 
PARENT 
𝜋 𝐾1 , 𝑄1,  
𝐼1, 𝜏1  
New equity, (𝑄1) 
Dividends (𝐷1) 
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In the model a parent company uses its profits (𝜋 𝐾1 ), new equity from its shareholders 
(𝑄1) and dividends from its subsidiary (𝐷2) to finance its investments (𝐼1), new equity for 
its subsidiary (𝑄2), dividends to its shareholders (𝐷1) and taxes (𝑇1 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2 ). The 
budget constraint for the parent company is:17 
𝜋 𝐾1 + 𝑄1 + 𝐷2 = 𝐼1 + 𝑄2 + 𝐷1 + 𝑇1 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2  (1) 
The budget constraint for the subsidiary is: 
𝜋 𝐾2 + 𝑄2 = 𝐼2 + 𝐷2 + 𝑇2 𝐾2, 𝐾1, 𝐵1, 𝐵2  (2) 
The stocks of capital (𝐾1 and 𝐾2) depreciate at rate 𝛿 (economic depreciation): 
?̇?1 = 𝐼1 − 𝛿𝐾1  and  ?̇?2 = 𝐼2 − 𝛿𝐾2 (3) 
The accounting stocks of capital (𝐵1 and 𝐵2) depreciate at rate 𝛾 (fiscal depreciation): 
?̇?1 = 𝐼1 − 𝛾𝐵1  and  ?̇?2 = 𝐼2 −  𝛾𝐵2 (4) 
The start-up stocks of capital at time 𝑡 = 0 are 𝐾1 0 = 𝐵1 0 = 𝑘1 and 𝐾2 0 = 𝐵2 0 =
𝑘2. 
The starting point for defining the AGI base is owners’ equity in the company’s 
balance sheet. As a basic accounting identity, this corresponds to the book value of 
capital (B1) plus the value of shareholdings in other companies. However, as under 
the ACE, the latter item is deducted in order to avoid cascading, i.e. inappropriate 
accumulation of the allowance in ownership chains.18 This implies that, in our 
simple model, the relevant equity concept (adjusted equity) equals the book value of 
capital (B1), the size of which depends on current and past investment and fiscal 
depreciation allowances (equation (4)).  
The draft directive proposal defines the AGI base (𝐴1) as the sum of annual changes 
in adjusted equity over a period of ten years (see Box 1). Let 𝑣  denote the length of 
the accumulation period. The AGI base is defined as the sum of net increases in 
investment for the last 𝑣  years (from 𝑡 − 𝑣 to 𝑡). Thus, in continuous time, we may 
write the AGI base 𝐴1 as follows:  
𝐴1 𝑡 = ∫ 𝑒
−𝛾 𝑡−𝑠 𝐼1 𝑠 𝑑𝑠
𝑡
max {0,𝑡−𝑣}
 
(5) 
By using equation (4) and integrating, we get the more practical formula  
                                                          
17
 Capital is the only input in the production function in our model. Taxes depend on both the capital and the 
accounting stock of the capital of both the parent company and the subsidiary. For details, see especially 
equations 7 and 8 below. Country 1 applies an exemption method for within-group dividend payments in its 
taxation. We further assume that 𝐷1, 𝐷2, 𝑄1 and 𝑄2 are non-negative, and that 𝜋 satisfies the usual Inada 
conditions. 
18
 The elimination of the cascading effect in the AGI is stipulated in paragraph 1 of Article 11 in the draft 
proposal (Box 1). For the discussions concerning cascading in the ACE, see IFS (1991), Devereux and 
Freeman (1991), Griffith et al. (2010), and Zangari (2014).  
 6 
 
𝐴1 = 𝐵1 − 𝑅1, (6) 
where 𝑅1 𝑡 = 𝑒
−𝛾𝑡𝑘1 for 0 < 𝑡 < 𝑣 and 𝑅1 𝑡 = 𝑒
−𝛾𝑣𝐵1 𝑡 − 𝑣  for 𝑡 ≥ 𝑣.  
The FA and SA differ only in terms of their definitions of taxes 𝑇1 and 𝑇2. In FA, the 
parent company’s taxes are19 
𝑇1 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2 = 𝜏1𝑠1 𝐾1, 𝐾2 𝑃 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2 , (7) 
where 𝑃 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2 = 𝜋 𝐾1 − 𝛾𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐴1 + 𝜋 𝐾2 − 𝛾𝐵2 − 𝑎𝐴2 and 𝑠1 𝐾1, 𝐾2 =
𝜎𝐾𝐾1
𝐾1+𝐾2
+ 𝑋1 is 
the tax base apportionment share of the parent company, with a constant weight 
0 < 𝜎𝐾 < 1 for the capital factor and an exogenous element, 𝑋1. The terms 𝛾𝐵1 and 𝛾𝐵2 are 
the depreciation allowances for taxation purposes and 𝑎𝐴1 and 𝑎𝐴2 are the AGI 
allowances, with 𝑎 being the AGI rate. 
Analogously, for the subsidiary the taxes are given by 
𝑇2 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2 = 𝜏2𝑠2 𝐾1, 𝐾2 𝑃 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2 , (8) 
where 𝑠2 𝐾1, 𝐾2 =
𝜎𝐾𝐾2
𝐾1+𝐾2
+ 𝑋2. 
In SA, each country taxes the profits of companies resident in its territory and no 
consolidation is made: 
𝑇1 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2 = 𝜏1 𝜋 𝐾1 − 𝛾𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐴1   and  𝑇2 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2 = 𝜏2 𝜋 𝐾2 − 𝛾𝐵2 − 𝑎𝐴2  (9) 
The MNE’s objective is now to maximize the value of its shares: 
𝑉 = ∫(𝐷1 𝑡 − 𝑄1 𝑡 )𝑒
−𝜌𝑡𝑑𝑡
∞
0
 (10) 
Here 𝜌 is the time-invariant rate of interest at which the economic agents can borrow and 
lend in the international capital markets.20 
With the elements of the investment model given above, we can derive the equations for 
both the parent’s and the subsidiary company’s cost of capital under AGI. Note that this 
result also includes the ACE in the special case where 𝑣 → ∞ (when 𝑒−𝛾𝑣 → 0). For the 
statement of the result, we define the constant 
𝐶 =
𝑎(1 − 𝑒− 𝛾+𝜌 𝑣) + 𝛾
𝜌 + 𝛾
, (11) 
                                                          
19
 In the CCCTB proposal the common tax base is constructed by pooling the company-specific tax bases, 
which are both determined by the company profits, the fiscal depreciation and the AGI. The apportionment is 
made according to an endogenous variable 𝐾1 (and 𝐾2) and an exogenous factor 𝑋1 (and 𝑋2). See also e.g. 
Pethig and Wagener (2007) and Nielsen et al. (2010). 
20
 The derivation of the objective function is based on the net cash flow 𝑌 = 𝐷1 − 𝑄1 and the no-arbitrage 
condition 𝑌 + ?̇? = 𝜌𝑉. See e.g. Auerbach (2002) and Sinn (1993). 
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which will be interpreted below as the present value of investment allowances. The proof 
of the following proposition and further technical assumptions are given in Appendix A. 
Proposition 1: (i) In the SA system, all optimal solutions of the problem (10) take constant 
values 𝐾𝑖 𝑡 = 𝐾𝑖
∗ for all 𝑡, where the numbers 𝐾𝑖
∗ are defined by 
𝜋′ 𝐾𝑖
∗ =
1 − 𝜏𝑖𝐶
1 − 𝜏𝑖
 𝜌 + 𝛿 , (12) 
for 𝑖 = 1,2. 
(ii) In the FA system, assuming that the maximization problem (10) admits a 
steady-state solution, the steady-state cost of capital of the parent company is:21 
                           𝜋′ 𝐾1 =
1−?̅? 𝐾1,𝐾2 𝐶
1−?̅? 𝐾1,𝐾2 
 𝜌 + 𝛿 +
𝜏1−𝜏2
1−?̅? 𝐾1,𝐾2 
𝜎𝐾𝐾2
 𝐾1+𝐾2 2
𝑃∗ 𝐾1, 𝐾2 , (13) 
where ?̅? is the average tax rate of the group ?̅? 𝐾1, 𝐾2 = 𝜎𝐾
𝜏1𝐾1+𝜏2𝐾2
𝐾1+𝐾2
+ 𝜏1𝑋1 + 𝜏2𝑋2 and 
𝑃∗ 𝐾1, 𝐾2 = 𝜋 𝐾1 + 𝜋 𝐾2 −  𝐾1 + 𝐾2 𝛿 𝑎 1 − 𝑒
−𝛾𝑣 /𝛾 + 1 . 
Comparing the cost of capital in FA to that in SA shows us some important aspects of the 
tax systems. We observe that the cost of capital given in (13) includes two terms. The 
first term, 
1−?̅? 𝐾1,𝐾2 𝐶
1−?̅? 𝐾1,𝐾2 
 𝜌 + 𝛿 , can be interpreted as giving the pre-tax cost of marginal 
investment assuming a given tax rate, ?̅?. It closely resembles the cost of capital under SA, 
1−𝜏𝑖𝐶
1−𝜏𝑖
 𝜌 + 𝛿 , but differs as the country-specific tax rate (𝜏𝑖) is replaced by the weighted 
average of the local tax rates of the corporate group (?̅?).22 This property of FA is familiar 
from earlier literature.23  
The second term on the right hand side of (13) reflects the effects via the average tax rate 
(?̅?)24 on the cost of capital. The term includes the difference between corporate tax rates. 
In the special case of equal tax rates (𝜏1 = 𝜏2 ⇒ 𝜏1 − 𝜏2 = 0 and 𝜏1 = 𝜏2 = ?̅?), the second term 
vanishes and the first term becomes identical to the cost of capital in SA in (12). The 
second term of (13) is also familiar from previous FA literature.         
Let us turn to the effects of the AGI allowance. We observe that in both (12) and (13) the 
present value of investment allowances, 𝐶, defined in (11) includes the AGI rate adjusted 
by the time restriction, 𝑎(1 − 𝑒− 𝛾+𝜌 𝑣) (effective AGI rate). The intuition of this expression 
can be found by considering a one-unit investment financed from equity. This investment 
provides the firm with a flow of equity allowances, the present value of which is 
∫  𝑎𝑒−𝛾𝑠 𝑒−𝜌𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠, where 𝑒−𝛾𝑠 is the book value of the investment (after fiscal depreciation) 
                                                          
21
 For the subsidiary we get a similar expression, with indexes 1 and 2 being interchanged. 
22
 Note that if the tax rates are the same  𝜏1 = 𝜏2 ⇒ 𝜏1 = 𝜏2 = 𝜏̅ , the equation for the cost of capital in FA 
becomes the same as in SA. Note also that the first term in (13) closely resembles the cost of capital in 
standard corporate income tax (CIT), but differs in two respects. In addition to the use of a weighted average, 
the present value of the investment allowances, C, differs from the standard results. See Devereux and 
Griffith, 2003. 
23
 See, e.g. Mintz and Weiner 2003 and Pethig and Wagener 2007. 
24
 Or, put differently, the effect via the apportionment shares.   
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at time 𝑠 and 𝑒−𝜌𝑠 is the discount factor. The value of this integral is 
1
𝛾+𝜌
𝑎(1 − 𝑒− 𝛾+𝜌 𝑡). If 
there is no time limit (as under ACE), i.e. 𝑡 → ∞, then the present value of the allowance 
flow reduces to 
1
𝛾+𝜌
𝑎. Instead, if there is an AGI-type time constraint  𝑡 = 𝑣 , we obtain 
the expression above. Observe that in a properly designed ACE where the rate is set to 
𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐸 = 𝜌, we have 𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐸 =
𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐸+𝛾
𝜌+𝛾
= 1. 25 In the AGI, 𝑎(1 − 𝑒− 𝛾+𝜌 𝑣) may deviate from 𝜌 
depending particularly on the rate of fiscal depreciation 𝛾 and the time limit 𝑣.  
Therefore, 𝐶𝐴𝐺𝐼 ≠ 1, which implies that the AGI does not have equally favorable neutrality 
properties as the ACE. 
One key feature of the second term of the cost of capital in FA, given in (13), is that it 
raises the cost of capital for a high-tax country  𝜏1 − 𝜏2 > 0 . In a low-tax country the 
outcome is the opposite. Together, these facts imply that FA distorts the location of 
investment in a multi-country setting where the tax rates differ.  
The second term is further affected by the long-run taxable profit 𝑃∗.26 This implies that 
all details of the definition of the taxable profit affect the size of the second term. For 
example, more generous tax allowances make the taxable profit smaller and reduce the 
distortions caused by FA.      
Now we are able to identify the effects of the AGI on the cost of capital in an FA system. 
The presence of the AGI (𝑎 > 0) decreases the cost of capital both in high- and low-tax 
countries via the first term.27 Compared to the ACE (𝑣 = ∞), the reduction in the cost of 
capital is smaller, however. The effect of the AGI through the second term depends on the 
relative magnitudes of the tax rates. The cost of capital in a high-tax country (the 
parent’s home country in our model) decreases via this term due to the AGI. For the low-
tax country the effect on the cost of capital is the opposite. Overall, the cost of capital 
unambiguously decreases due to the AGI for a company in the country with a higher tax 
rate, while for the company in the country with a lower tax rate, the effect of the AGI 
remains ambiguous and depends on the relative magnitudes of the two terms in equation 
(13). These observations lead to our Corollary 1.  
Corollary 1: The AGI decreases the cost of capital of companies in high-tax countries in an 
FA tax system. For companies in low-tax countries, the effect on the cost of capital remains 
ambiguous. 
The cost of capital given in Proposition 1 also demonstrates another issue. The AGI 
mitigates the difference in the cost of capital arising from the difference in tax rates in 
FA. To observe this, first note that the last term in equation (13) increases the cost of 
capital in the country with a higher tax rate and reduces it in the country with a lower 
tax rate, and therefore increases the cost of capital gap between countries with different 
tax rates. Thus, FA pushes investment towards low-tax countries, and therefore causes a 
distortion in the location of investment. This push is larger the larger the terms 
                                                          
25
 𝐶 = 1 implies that the cost of capital becomes independent of the taxes, which in turn implies that the tax 
system is neutral.  
26
 𝑃∗ 𝐾1, 𝐾2  is just shorthand for the taxable profit 𝑃 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2  for large 𝑡 (𝑡 > 𝑣) and with 𝐵 replaced by its 
long-run value  𝛿/𝛾 𝐾. 
27
 1 − 𝑒− 𝛾+𝜌 𝑣 > 0, ?̅? 𝐾1, 𝐾2 > 0, 𝜌 + 𝛾 > 0, 𝜌 + 𝛿 > 0, 1 − ?̅? 𝐾1, 𝐾2 > 0 and 𝑎 > 0. 
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multiplying the tax rate difference (
𝜎𝐾𝐾2
 𝐾1+𝐾2 2
 and 𝑃∗ 𝐾1, 𝐾2 ). As the AGI decreases one of 
these terms, it mitigates the cost of capital gap between companies in high-tax and low-
tax countries, and therefore also mitigates the investment push towards low-tax 
countries. Corollary 2 summarizes this conclusion. 
Corollary 2: The AGI decreases the FA-induced investment push towards low-tax 
countries by decreasing the cost of capital gap between companies in high-tax and low-tax 
countries. 
In summary, we show via our dynamic investment model that the AGI affects investment 
incentives in FA. More specifically, we show that the AGI strengthens the investment 
incentives of companies in high-tax countries in the FA tax system. The AGI also reduces 
the distortion in the investment location decisions created by FA. However, the ACE 
would both increase the investment incentives and reduce the distortion more than the 
AGI. 
 
3. Calculations on the Investment-Enhancing Effects of the AGI 
In this section we employ the cost of capital expressions derived in the previous section 
to illustrate how the investment incentives change in FA due to the AGI. In our 
calculations we consider both the extent to which the investment incentives change and 
how the parameter values affect these incentives in different cases. Regarding the 
parameters, we consider the rate of economic depreciation (δ), accelerated fiscal 
depreciation (𝛾 > 𝛿), the discount rate (𝜌), the AGI rate (𝑎) and the accumulation period of 
the AGI base (𝑣). Let us first consider the dependence of the cost of capital on the 
depreciation rate in a case where the rate of economic depreciation (δ) and the rate of 
fiscal depreciation (𝛾) are the same. The assumption on the similarity of the depreciation 
rates will be relaxed later. 
As our baseline, we consider a case where the tax-related parameters and economic 
parameters are chosen according to the first column in the upper panel of Table 1. In our 
baseline case, the corporate tax rate of both countries is 21.9%28, the rate of economic 
depreciation is 25% per year, the rate of fiscal depreciation 25% per year, the discount 
rate 0.05, the AGI rate 5%, and the time the investment remains in the AGI base is 10 
years. The other columns in the table consider cases where the rate of economic 
depreciation varies from the baseline of 25%. 
The lower panel in Table 1 shows the cost of capital for the three separate cases: FA with 
no equity allowance, FA with AGI and FA with ACE.29 Without an equity allowance, the 
(after-depreciation) cost of capital is 0.0640 in the baseline case.30 For the AGI, it is 
clearly lower, 0.0507. Compared to the case with no allowance for corporate equity, the 
AGI reduces the cost of capital by 20.8%. However, the ACE also increases the 
                                                          
28
 The EU average top rate of tax on corporate income was 21.9% in 2017 (EC 2017). In the baseline case 
there are no tax rate differences (𝜏1 = 𝜏2). 
29
 The cost of capital refers to the minimum yield after depreciation has been taken into account (𝜋1
′  𝐾1 − 𝛿). 
30
 In the calculations we make the following assumptions: 𝑋1 = 𝑋2 = 0, 𝜎𝐾 = 1 and 𝜋 𝐾 = √𝐾. 
 10 
 
investment incentives. Compared to the case without an equity allowance, the ACE 
decreases the cost of capital slightly more than the AGI, by 21.9% in the baseline case 
(from 0.0640 to 0.0500). Thus, the difference between the AGI and the ACE in increasing 
the investment incentives is not large, with the increase in the cost of capital being 
roughly one fifth for both allowances. The implied increases for the capital levels of the 
AGI and the ACE in our model are 9.1% and 9.6% respectively. The result for the AGI 
remains close to that for the ACE, because the difference between them results only from 
investments made more than 10 years ago, which therefore become heavily discounted.31 
 Table 1. Cost of Capital: Rate of Economic Depreciation 
Tax Parameters and Economic Parameters (1 BASE) (2) (3) (4) 
  Corporate Tax Rate in Country 1 𝜏1 0.219 0.219 0.219 0.219 
  Corporate Tax Rate in Country 2 𝜏2 0.219 0.219 0.219 0.219 
  Rate of Economic Depreciation δ  0.25 0.15 0.10 0.05 
  Rate of Fiscal Depreciation γ  0.25 0.15 0.10 0.05 
  Discount Rate 𝜌 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
  AGI Rate a 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
  Duration of Investment in AGI v 10 10 10 10 
Cost of Capital     
  FA, No Equity Allowance 0.0640  0.0640  0.0640 0.0640 
  AGI 0.0507 0.0519  0.0531 0.0552 
  ACE 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 
 
In the other columns of the table we vary the rate of economic depreciation to take the 
values 0.15, 0.10 and 0.05. We observe that the cost of capital varies according to the 
depreciation rate only in the presence of AGI, whereas for the ACE and the case without 
an equity allowance they remain intact. 
The observations from Table 1 show us a few things. First, compared to the case with no 
allowance the AGI and the ACE decrease the cost of capital. Second, the reduction is 
larger in the ACE. Third, in the ACE the reduction remains independent of the 
depreciation rate, whereas for the AGI the reduction is larger and closer to that of the 
ACE the higher the depreciation rate. Thus the cost of capital in the AGI remains 
dependent on the parameter values and therefore it does not have the same neutrality 
properties as the ACE. 
The ways in which investment incentives depend on other parameters are studied in 
Appendix B. The results show that the cost of capital in the AGI remains dependent on 
the parameter values, whereas in the ACE it is more often independent of the parameter 
values. The ACE also provides better investment incentives than the AGI. 
A particularly interesting feature of the AGI is how its base accumulates. This is also the 
thing that makes the AGI differ from the ACE. Figure 2 focuses on how the cost of capital 
in the AGI depends on the number of years that are included in the AGI base. When the 
number of years is zero, the cost of capital in the AGI coincides with the case without an 
                                                          
31
 Observe that the value of the allowance is discounted at the rate of 𝜌 + 𝛾, which may be high particularly if 
the rate of depreciation is high, see definition of 𝐶 in Proposition 1. 
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equity allowance (the cost of capital is 0.064). However, when the number of years 
increases the cost of capital in the AGI decreases and converges to the cost of capital in 
the ACE (0.05). It is also worth noting that with an accumulation period of 10 years it is 
already very close to that of the ACE (0.0507). Moreover, we observe in the figure that the 
cost of capital in the AGI is close to mid-way between those for the case without an 
equity allowance and the ACE already with a duration of about 2 years.  
We also study how the length of the accumulation period of the AGI base affects the cost 
of capital when the depreciation rates vary. Figure 3 in Appendix B illustrates this issue. 
The results are qualitatively the same as in Figure 2: when the AGI base is determined 
according to few years only the cost of capital in the AGI remains close to that without an 
equity allowance, whereas when the number of years increases the cost of capital in the 
AGI converges to that in the ACE. The cost of capital in the AGI thus remains heavily 
dependent on the accumulation period. 
Figure 2: Cost of Capital and Duration of Investment in AGI  
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4. Tax Competition 
In this section we consider the effects of the AGI on tax competition between countries.32 
We employ a simpler model than in section 2 and consider two symmetric countries, in 
each of which resides an MNE whose subsidiary resides in the other country.33 The 
model includes two choices: first, the corporate groups 𝐺 and ?̃? choose their capital levels 
in countries 1 (𝐾1, ?̃?1) and 2 (𝐾2, ?̃?2), and second, the countries choose their tax rates (𝜏1, 
𝜏2).  
The corporate group maximizes its net-of-tax profits:34 
П𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼 = [𝜋 𝐾1 + 𝜋 𝐾2 − 𝜌𝐾] − ?̅? [𝜋 𝐾1 + 𝜋 𝐾2 − 𝜌𝐴]⏟            
= 𝑃𝐹𝐴 𝐾1,𝐾2 
 
(14) 
Here the first term represents the corporate group’s pre-tax profit and the latter one its 
taxes. 𝐴 = 𝐴1 + 𝐴2 is the AGI base, which is defined to be the capital accumulated over 
the last 10 years35 and 𝜌 stands for the AGI rate. ?̅? is the capital-weighted average tax 
rate,  ?̅? =
𝐾1
𝐾
𝜏1 +
𝐾2
𝐾
𝜏2. The optimality condition is (see Appendix C): 
𝜕П𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼
𝜕𝐾1
=  1 − ?̅? [𝜋′ 𝐾1 − 𝜋
′ 𝐾2 ] −
1
𝐾
 𝜏1 − 𝜏2 [𝜋 𝐾1 + 𝜋 𝐾2 − 𝜌𝐴] = 0 (15) 
Second, each country maximizes its national welfare, 𝑊𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼, which is defined as a 
combination of its tax revenue 𝑇𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼 and the MNE’s net-of-tax profits, 𝛱𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼, weighted 
by 𝜆.36 The taxes to be paid to country 1 are defined by three factors: the consolidated tax 
bases (𝑃𝐹𝐴 𝐾1, 𝐾2  and 𝑃
𝐹𝐴 ?̃?1, ?̃?2 ) are apportioned by the apportionment factors (
𝐾1
𝐾
 and 
?̃?1
?̃?
) and the tax rate (𝜏1) is then applied to the apportioned tax bases, 
𝑇1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼 = 𝜏1
𝐾1
𝐾
𝑃𝐹𝐴 𝐾1, 𝐾2 + 𝜏1
?̃?1
?̃?
𝑃𝐹𝐴(?̃?1, ?̃?2). The national welfare of country 1 thus reads as 
follows: 
𝑊1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼 = 𝑇1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼 + 𝜆𝛱𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼 (16) 
                                                          
32
 Our approach has common features with Devereux et al. (2008) and section 4.5 in Keen and Konrad 
(2013). As in the earlier literature, tax competition is measured by the level of the optimal equilibrium tax 
rate. 
33
 Compared to the above we consider a case where the capital does not depreciate (𝛿 = 𝛾 = 0), the AGI rate is 
aligned with the discount rate (𝑎 = 𝜌  and capital is the only element in the formulary apportionment (no 
exogenous variables, like 𝑋 above). The overall capital stocks for both MNEs are fixed, 𝐾 = 𝐾1 + 𝐾2 for an 
MNE (𝐺) residing in country 1 and ?̃? = ?̃?1 + ?̃?2 for an MNE (?̃?) residing in country 2. Subindex 1 refers to 
location in country 1. For example ?̃?1 corresponds to the capital level of a subsidiary located in country 1 
(whose parent is located in country 2). The production technologies are considered to be the same both 
within an MNE and across MNEs (the production function 𝜋 is the same for all four companies in our model). 
34
 The other corporate group similarly maximizes its net-of-profits 
П̅𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼 = [𝜋(𝐾1) + 𝜋(𝐾2) − 𝜌𝐾] − ?̂? [𝜋(𝐾1) + 𝜋(𝐾2) − 𝜌?̃?]⏟              
= 𝑃𝐹𝐴 𝐾1,𝐾2 
 , where ?̂? =
𝐾1
𝐾
𝜏1 +
𝐾2
𝐾
𝜏2. 
35
 Note that in the steady-state 𝐴 < 𝐾, where 𝐾 is the overall capital stock, by Proposition 1 (ii). 
36
  𝜆 ∊ [0,1] is a relative weight on the profit component, where the case 𝜆 = 0 refers to a tax revenue-
maximizing government (Leviathian government). 
 13 
 
In a symmetric equilibrium the optimal tax rate of country 1 is given by the equation 
given in Proposition 2. The proof is given in Appendix C.  
Proposition 2: The optimal tax rate of country 1 in a symmetric tax competition model with 
the FA tax system and the AGI is determined by the following equation:37 
𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼
1 − 𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼 = −
 2 − 𝜆 𝐾1
2𝜋′′ 𝐾1 
𝜋 𝐾1 − 𝜌𝐴1
 > 0  (17) 
Without the AGI, 𝐴1 = 0 and thus the condition for the optimal tax rate without an equity 
allowance (noEA) reduces to 
𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝑛𝑜𝐸𝐴
1−𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝑛𝑜𝐸𝐴 = −
 2−𝜆 𝐾1
2𝜋′′ 𝐾1 
𝜋 𝐾1 
. Because the left-hand side of the 
equation increases with the tax rate, the optimal tax rate is lower without the AGI than 
with it (𝜏𝐴
𝐹𝐴,𝑛𝑜𝐸𝐴 < 𝜏𝐴
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼 . Thus without the AGI, the tax competition between countries 
remains tougher. This conclusion is given in Corollary 3. 
Corollary 3: The AGI reduces tax competition between countries in FA 
We also observe from equation (17) that the tax rate decreases with the welfare weight for 
company profits (𝜆). Thus in the FA tax system a pure tax revenue-maximizing 
government (𝜆 = 0) retains the tax competition between countries less intense than one 
that also takes company profits into account in its welfare. 
The optimal tax rate under the ACE differs from that for the AGI as the base for the 
allowance is now the whole capital stock (𝐾1), not just that accumulated over the last 10 
years only (𝐴1): 
𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐶𝐸
1 − 𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐶𝐸 = −
 2 − 𝜆 𝐾1
2𝜋′′ 𝐾1 
𝜋 𝐾1 − 𝜌𝐾1
 (18) 
Because 𝐴1 < 𝐾1, the ACE reduces tax competition even more than the AGI by leaving tax 
rates at higher levels. This conclusion is given in Corollary 4. 
Corollary 4: The ACE reduces tax competition between countries more than the AGI 
Let us next compare the tax competition in the current SA-based international corporate 
tax system to that in FA. For SA the group-level profits are: 
П𝑆𝐴 =  1 − 𝜏1 𝜋 𝐾1 +  1 − 𝜏2 𝜋 𝐾2 − 𝜌 𝐾1 + 𝐾2  (19) 
And the optimal tax rate is (see Appendix C): 
𝜏1
𝑆𝐴
1 − 𝜏1
𝑆𝐴 = −
 2 − 𝜆 𝜋 𝐾1 𝜋
′′ 𝐾1 
𝜋′ 𝐾1 2
 (20) 
First, we observe that as with FA, the tax rate decreases with the welfare weight for 
company profits (𝜆) in SA. Thus in SA a pure tax revenue-maximizing government (𝜆 = 0) 
                                                          
37
 Note that the higher the right-hand side of the equation, the higher the optimal tax rate 𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼. 
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reduces the tax competition between countries compared to one that also takes company 
profits into account in its welfare. 
The introduction of FA without an equity allowance intensifies tax competition by 
lowering tax rates and the effect is larger the larger the relative weight of tax revenue (i.e. 
the smaller the 𝜆), because:  
𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝑛𝑜𝐸𝐴
1 − 𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝑛𝑜𝐸𝐴 −
𝜏1
𝑆𝐴
1 − 𝜏1
𝑆𝐴 =
 2 − 𝜆 𝜋′′ 𝐾1 
𝜋′ 𝐾1 2𝜋 𝐾1 
[𝜋 𝐾1 
2 −  𝜋′ 𝐾1 𝐾1 
2] < 0 (21) 
Introducing FA together with the AGI affects tax competition, but the sign of the effects 
remains ambiguous: 
𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼
1 − 𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼 −
𝜏1
𝑆𝐴
1 − 𝜏1
𝑆𝐴 =
 2 − 𝜆 𝜋′′ 𝐾1 
𝜋′ 𝐾1 2 𝜋 𝐾1 − 𝜌𝐴1 
{𝜋 𝐾1 
2 − (𝜋′ 𝐾1 𝐾1)
2
− 𝜌𝐴1𝜋 𝐾1 } (22) 
From equation (22) we see that tax competition decreases when 𝜌𝐴1𝜋 𝐾1 > 𝜋 𝐾1 
2 −
(𝜋′ 𝐾1 𝐾1)
2
. This means that tax competition decreases with a sufficiently generous AGI 
allowance. This observation is provided in Corollary 5.  
Corollary 5: With a sufficiently generous AGI allowance, a replacement of the SA tax 
system by the FA system with the AGI reduces tax competition between countries. 
Let us next illustrate the effects of the AGI in decreasing tax competition between 
countries by employing the formulas derived in the above. One important factor affecting 
the calculations is the AGI rate. Table 2 shows the results for optimal tax rates38 with the 
AGI rate varying between 0.02 and 0.07.39 
Table 2. Optimal Tax Rates 
AGI Rate (𝑎 = 𝜌)       0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 
T
a
x
 R
a
te
 
               𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝑛𝑜𝐸𝐴  33.3 % 33.3 % 33.3 % 33.3 % 33.3 % 33.3 % 
   𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼 33.8 % 34.1 % 34.4 % 34.6 % 34.9 % 35.2 % 
   𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐶𝐸 34.4 % 34.9 % 35.4 % 36.0 % 36.6 % 37.2 % 
 
The first column in the table shows that with the smallest possible AGI rate, 0.02, tax 
competition would be reduced by the AGI, because the tax rate would remain 0.5 
percentage points higher in the presence of the AGI compared to the case without an 
equity allowance. For the ACE, the tax competition would in this case decrease even 
more: by 1.1 percentage points. The other columns of the table show that the larger the 
AGI rate, the larger the reduction in the tax competition. We also observe that the tax 
rate increases from the case without an equity allowance to the ACE are roughly twice 
the size of the increase from the case with no equity allowance to the AGI. For an AGI 
                                                          
38
 In our calculations we have chosen the production function to be 𝜋 𝐾 = √𝐾, the overall capital level 𝐾 =
10, the government is Leviathian (𝜆 = 0) and half of the capital is considered to be accumulated over the last 
ten years. 
39
 Note that according to the draft directive (EC 2016a), the AGI rate is at least 2 percentage points. 
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rate of 0.07, the tax rate increase is 1.9 percentage points for the AGI and 3.9 percentage 
points for the ACE. 
 
5. Discussion 
The main focus in our study has been on the AGI, which may be considered as a variant 
of the ACE, where not only the debt-related costs but also the notional costs of equity are 
tax-deductible. In order to compare implications of these for investment incentives and 
tax competition we have given the results for both the AGI and the ACE, making our 
paper the first to study the properties of the AGI. The results show that even if the ACE 
seems to broadly achieve its main original targets - removal of the debt bias and the 
investment neutrality within the tax system - the AGI does not achieve these properties. 
However, in line with the targets of the draft proposal, the AGI still increases investment 
incentives (and is thus likely to boost the economy) and decreases the debt bias. 
Regarding tax competition, the AGI also makes an improvement compared to an FA tax 
system without an equity allowance by decreasing tax competition. However, the ACE 
outperforms the AGI also in this respect. Therefore, if the investment incentives and tax 
competition implications of the two equity allowances were the only measures 
determining their ranking, the ACE would be the number one choice. However, taking 
into account the other side of the story also, the possible tax revenue losses – a critique 
made of the ACE – might change the ranking. Given that there is a trade-off between 
incentives and tax revenue, and that the only thing that differentiates the AGI and the 
ACE is the accumulation period of the AGI allowance, a desirable balance is likely to be 
found by choosing the accumulation period of the AGI in a desirable way. 
Our results add some new aspects to earlier contributions that have excluded the 
detailed properties of the AGI from their scope. Whereas the calculations in the Impact 
Assessment (EC 2016c; IA) accompanying the CCCTB proposal assume the AGI to be a 
fixed fraction (20%) of the ACE, we show that (in terms of investment incentives and tax 
competition) their relationship cannot be captured by a single number, but the 
dependence is non-linear. Moreover, in light of our results the fraction employed in the 
IA seems to be estimated too low (see Table 1 and Figure 2). 
There are also a few important aspects regarding the AGI that remain beyond our study, 
and are left for future studies. First, given that the AGI is supposed to be implemented as 
part of the CCCTB proposed for the EU countries, it changes the taxation in these 
countries relative to third countries that do not feature changes in their cost of capital, 
like the US or tax havens. Therefore, as the AGI increases investment incentives, it 
makes the EU countries more lucrative for foreign investments. Thus one could also 
consider the AGI to be a tax competition tool in this respect.40 Second, our study does 
not include direct investments in foreign countries, and in our model all overseas 
investments are channeled via the subsidiary. Including direct investments by the parent 
company in foreign countries could provide additional insight by affecting the allocation 
                                                          
40
 Hebous and Ruf (2017) make the point that the ACE opens the door for international tax-planning 
regarding profit-shifting. We show that the equity allowance (both AGI and ACE) may provide tax-planning 
incentives not only regarding profit-shifting, but also the real activity. 
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of the tax base across countries. Third, our model does not include debt-financing, which 
could also provide additional insight into the implications of the AGI. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We have studied how the Allowance for Growth and Investment (AGI) proposed in the 
European Commission proposal for the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB) affects the investment incentives of companies and tax competition between 
countries. Our paper, which is the first to study the properties of the AGI, shows some 
intriguing results. Compared to a CCCTB without any allowances for corporate equity, 
we find that a corresponding tax system with the AGI increases investment incentives in 
high-tax countries. We also find that while the CCCTB pushes investments towards low-
tax countries by increasing the cost of capital gap between countries with different tax 
rates, the AGI reduces the gap and therefore also the push of investments towards low-
tax countries. However, we also find that the AGI distorts the allocation of capital with 
respect to several dimensions, like economic depreciation, and in the presence of 
accelerated depreciation. Regarding the strategic interaction between countries, we find 
that the AGI reduces tax competition in a consolidated tax system. Also, while a 
replacement of the current separate accounting (SA) tax system by a CCCTB without an 
equity allowance would intensify tax competition between countries, the introduction of a 
CCCTB with the AGI might result in a reduction in tax competition. The sign of the effect 
depends on the generosity of the AGI allowance. 
We also provide new results for the standard Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) 
discussed intensively in the literature. We first show that the ACE reduces the FA-
induced investment push towards low-tax countries. Regarding the strategic responses 
to other countries’ decisions, we show that the ACE reduces tax competition between 
countries. Regarding the comparison between the two equity allowances being studied 
(AGI and ACE), we find that even if the AGI both increases investment incentives and 
reduces tax competition, the ACE would perform better regarding these aspects. In 
addition, unlike the AGI, the ACE removes the debt bias completely and does not distort 
the investment incentives under accelerated depreciation schedules. The ACE has 
therefore better neutrality properties than the AGI. However, it has been argued that the 
ACE induces large tax revenue losses, which may require tax rate increases in order to 
finance them (see Bond 2000 and Griffith et al. 2010). 
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1.  
In this Appendix we present a proof of Proposition 1. We state and prove the result in two 
separate parts, Proposition A.1 and Proposition A.2, for SA and FA, respectively. We first 
restate the problem with all necessary assumptions. Let ℝ+ = [0,∞  and denote by Ω the 
set of functions 𝑓 on ℝ+ such that  𝑓 is almost everywhere continuous and 
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∫ |𝑓 𝑡 |𝑒−𝜌𝑡
∞
0
𝑑𝑡 < ∞.41 Let 𝑘𝑖 ≥ 0,  𝑎 ≥ 1, 𝛿 > 0, 𝜌 > 0, 0 ≤ 𝜏1, 𝜏2 < 1, 𝑣 ≥ 0, 𝑋𝑖 > 0 be 
constants, abbreviate 𝑗 = 𝑒−𝛾𝑣 and define 𝑅1 𝑡 = 𝑒
−𝛾𝑡𝑘1 for 0 < 𝑡 < 𝑣 and 𝑅1 𝑡 = 𝑗𝐵1 𝑡 − 𝑣  
for 𝑡 ≥ 𝑣. The objective is to find a policy  𝐷1, 𝑄1, 𝐷2, 𝑄2 ∈ Ω
4 which maximizes  
∫(𝐷1 𝑡 − 𝑄1 𝑡 )𝑒
−𝜌𝑡𝑑𝑡
∞
0
 (A.1) 
subject to 
𝜋 𝐾1 + 𝑄1 + 𝐷2 = 𝐼1 + 𝑄2 + 𝐷1 + 𝑇1 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2 , 
𝜋 𝐾2 + 𝑄2 = 𝐼2 + 𝐷2 + 𝑇2 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2 , 
?̇?𝑖 = 𝐼𝑖 − 𝛿𝐾𝑖          a. e. on ℝ+,      𝑖 = 1,2, 
?̇?𝑖 = 𝐼𝑖 − 𝛾𝐵𝑖          a. e. on ℝ+,      𝑖 = 1,2, 
𝐴𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖 − 𝑅𝑖 ,      𝑖 = 1,2, 
𝐵𝑖 0 = 𝐾𝑖 0 = 𝑘𝑖 ≥ 0, 
𝐷1 ≥ 0,𝐷2 ≥ 0,𝑄1 ≥ 0,𝑄2 ≥ 0, 
where (i) 𝐾𝑖 and 𝐵𝑖 are continuous and almost everywhere differentiable on ℝ+, (ii) 𝜋 𝐾𝑖 , 
𝐵𝑖 and 𝑇𝑖 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2  belong to Ω, (iii) lim𝑡→∞ 𝐾𝑖 𝑡 𝐸 𝑡 = 0, and (iv) 𝜋:ℝ+ → ℝ+ satisfies the 
usual Inada conditions. Further, in FA, 
𝑇1 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2 = 𝜏1𝑠1 𝐾1, 𝐾2  𝜋 𝐾1 − 𝛾𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐴1 + 𝜋 𝐾2 − 𝛾𝐵2 − 𝑎𝐴2 , 
𝑇2 𝐾2, 𝐾1, 𝐵1, 𝐵2 = 𝜏2𝑠2 𝐾2, 𝐾1  𝜋 𝐾1 − 𝛾𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐴1 + 𝜋 𝐾2 − 𝛾𝐵2 − 𝑎𝐴2 , 
𝑠𝑖(𝐾𝑖, 𝐾𝑗) = 𝜎𝐾
𝐾𝑖
𝐾𝑖 + 𝐾𝑗
+ 𝑋𝑖 ,        𝑖 = 1,2. 
In SA,  
𝑇1 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2 = 𝜏1 𝜋 𝐾1 − 𝛾𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐴1   and  𝑇2 𝐾2, 𝐾1, 𝐵1, 𝐵2 = 𝜏2 𝜋 𝐾2 − 𝛾𝐵2 − 𝑎𝐴2 . 
A policy  𝐷1, 𝑄1, 𝐷2, 𝑄2  is said to be admissible if it satisfies all of the above conditions. We 
denote the set of all admissible policies by 𝛤. 
We first consider SA only. 
Let the numbers 𝐾𝑖
∗ be given by the equations 
                                                          
41
 A function f is almost everywhere (a.e.) continuous (respectively differentiable) on ℝ+ if for every finite 
subinterval of ℝ+ there is a finite number of points where f is not continuous (respectively differentiable). 
This assumption could be relaxed, but it allows a suitable generality of our main result.  
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𝜋′ 𝐾𝑖
∗ =
(1 − 𝜏𝑖
𝑎(1 − 𝑒− 𝛾+𝜌 𝑣) + 𝛾
𝜌 + 𝛾  )
1 − 𝜏𝑖
 𝜌 + 𝛿 . 
(A.2) 
We assume the constants 𝜏𝑖, 𝜌, 𝛿, 𝑎, 𝛾, 𝑣 chosen so that the right-hand side of (A.2) is 
positive. 
Proposition 1.(i) is contained in the following result. Note that due to the delayed terms 𝑅𝑖 
this is a non-standard version of an optimal control problem. Problems with delayed 
response can be solved with the help of a suitable form of the Pontryagin maximum 
principle (see, for example; Kamien & Schwartz, 2012). However, as our model is slightly 
more complex, we below present a complete proof of Proposition A.1 along the lines of the 
argument given in Section 19 of Kamien & Schwartz (2012). 
Proposition A.1: Consider SA. A policy  𝐷1, 𝑄1, 𝐷2, 𝑄2 ∈ 𝛤 maximizes the objective function 
in (A.1) if and only if 𝐾𝑖 𝑡 = 𝐾𝑖
∗ for all 𝑡, for 𝑖 = 1,2. In particular, the optimal levels of cost of 
capital in countries 1 and 2 are 𝜋′ 𝐾1
∗  and 𝜋′ 𝐾2
∗  for all 𝑡. 
Proof of Proposition A.1: Abbreviate 𝑐 = 𝑒−𝜌𝑣 and 𝐸 𝑡 = 𝑒−𝜌𝑡. Let  𝐷1, 𝑄1, 𝐷2, 𝑄2 ∈ Γ be such 
that 𝐾𝑖 𝑡 = 𝐾𝑖
∗ for all 𝑡 and 𝑖 = 1,2. Define the constants (or costate variables) 𝜆𝑖 and 𝜇𝑖 
(𝑖 = 1,2) as 
𝜆𝑖 =  1 − 𝜏𝑖 
𝜋′ 𝐾𝑖
∗ 
 𝜌 + 𝛿 
= 1 − 𝜏𝑖
𝑎(1 − 𝑒− 𝛾+𝜌 𝑣) + 𝛾
𝜌 + 𝛾
  
𝜇𝑖 = 1 −  1 − 𝜏𝑖 
𝜋′ 𝐾𝑖
∗ 
 𝜌 + 𝛿 
= 𝜏𝑖
𝑎(1 − 𝑒− 𝛾+𝜌 𝑣) + 𝛾
𝜌 + 𝛾
.  
Then 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 = 1 and 0 < 𝜆𝑖, 𝜇𝑖 < 1 for 𝑖 = 1,2. Let  𝐷1
′ , 𝑄1
′ , 𝐷2
′ , 𝑄2
′  ∈ Γ be any admissible 
solution which does not satisfy 𝐾𝑖 𝑡 = 𝐾𝑖
∗ for all 𝑡 and 𝑖 = 1,2. Then 𝐾𝑖
′ 𝑡′ ≠ 𝐾𝑖
∗ for some 
𝑡′ > 0 and 𝑖 = 1 or 2. Without loss of generality, we may assume that this holds for 𝑖 = 1. 
Consider the differences ?̃?𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖 − 𝐷𝑖
′ and ?̃?𝑖 = 𝑄𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖
′. Since  𝐷1
′ , 𝑄1
′ , 𝐷2
′ , 𝑄2
′   is chosen 
arbitrarily, the proof of Proposition A.1 is completed once we show that 
Δ ≔ ∫(?̃?1 − ?̃?1)𝐸
∞
0
𝑑𝑡 > 0. 
It follows from the constraints of the problem that 
?̃?1 − ?̃?1 = ∑ 1 − 𝜏𝑖 (𝜋 𝐾𝑖 − 𝜋 𝐾𝑖
′ ) + 𝜏𝑖𝛾?̃?𝑖 + 𝜏𝑖𝑎(?̃?𝑖 − ?̃?𝑖) + 𝜆𝑖 (−𝛿?̃?𝑖 − ?̇̃?𝑖) + 𝜇𝑖 (−𝛾?̃?𝑖 − ?̇̃?𝑖)
2
𝑖=1
, 
where ?̇̃?𝑖 = ?̇?𝑖 − ?̇?𝑖
′ and ?̇̃?𝑖 = ?̇?𝑖 − ?̇?𝑖
′ . 
We apply the following three facts: First, by the concavity of 𝜋 and the identity 𝐾𝑖 = 𝐾𝑖
∗, 
 1 − 𝜏𝑖 (𝜋 𝐾𝑖 − 𝜋 𝐾𝑖
′ ) ≥  1 − 𝜏𝑖 𝜋
′ 𝐾𝑖  𝐾𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖
′ = 𝜆𝑖 𝜌 + 𝛿 ?̃?𝑖. (A.3) 
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Second, since ?̃?𝑖 𝑡 = 0, for 𝑡 < 𝑣, we get by a change of variables, 
∫ ?̃?𝑖𝐸
∞
0
𝑑𝑡 = ∫ ?̃?𝑖𝐸
∞
𝑣
𝑑𝑡 = 𝑗∫ ?̃?𝑖 𝑡 − 𝑣 𝐸 𝑡 
∞
𝑣
𝑑𝑡 = 𝑗∫ ?̃?𝑖 𝑡 𝐸 𝑡 + 𝑣 
∞
0
𝑑𝑡 = 𝑐𝑗∫ ?̃?𝑖𝐸
∞
0
𝑑𝑡. (A.4) 
Third, by the definition of 𝜇𝑖, 
𝜏𝑖𝛾 + 𝜏𝑖𝑎 1 − 𝑐𝑗 = 𝜇𝑖 𝜌 + 𝛾 . 
Inserting these facts to Δ yields us the lower estimate 
Δ = ∫(?̃?1 − ?̃?1)𝐸
∞
0
𝑑𝑡 ≥ ∫ (∑𝜆𝑖 𝜌 + 𝛿 ?̃?𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 𝜌 + 𝛾 ?̃?𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖 (−𝛿?̃?𝑖 − ?̇̃?𝑖) + 𝜇𝑖 (−𝛾?̃?𝑖 − ?̇̃?𝑖)
2
𝑖=1
)𝐸
∞
0
𝑑𝑡
= ∫ (∑𝜆𝑖 (𝜌?̃?𝑖 − ?̇̃?𝑖) + 𝜇𝑖 (𝜌?̃?𝑖 − ?̇̃?𝑖)
2
𝑖=1
)𝐸
∞
0
𝑑𝑡 = ∑𝜆𝑖 ∫ −(?̃?𝑖𝐸)′
∞
0
𝑑𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 ∫ −(?̃?𝑖𝐸)′
∞
0
𝑑𝑡
2
𝑖=1
= ∑𝜆𝑖?̃?𝑖 0 + 𝜇𝑖?̃?𝑖 0 
2
𝑖=1
= 0, 
where the last steps employed the assumption lim𝑡→∞ 𝐾𝑖 𝑡 𝐸 𝑡 = 0 as well as the 
identities ?̃?𝑖 0 = ?̃?𝑖 0 = 0 and  𝜆𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 = 1.  
Because 𝐾1
′ 𝑡′ ≠ 𝐾1
∗ for some 𝑡′ > 0 and 𝐾1
′ is continuous, 𝐾1
′ ≠ 𝐾1
∗ holds on some open 
interval 𝑆. On this interval the inequality (A.3) is strict, by the strict concavity of 𝜋. This 
implies that the conclusion Δ ≥ 0 also holds as a strict inequality, Δ > 0. This shows that 
the condition 𝐾𝑖 = 𝐾𝑖
∗ (𝑖 = 1,2) determines the optimal policies uniquely. This completes 
the proof of Proposition A.1. 
We next consider FA and concentrate on the long-run (steady-state) solution only.  
Let 
?̅? 𝐾1, 𝐾2 = 𝜏1𝑠1 𝐾1, 𝐾2 + 𝜏2𝑠2 𝐾2, 𝐾1  
and 
𝑃 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2, 𝑅1, 𝑅2 = 𝜋 𝐾1 + 𝜋 𝐾2 −  𝛾 + 𝑎  𝐵1 + 𝐵2 + 𝑎 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 . 
Let 𝐾𝑖
∗ and 𝐵𝑖
∗ and the (costate) variables 𝜆𝑖 and 𝜇𝑖 be defined by the state equations, the 
equations  
?̇?1 =  𝜌 + 𝛿 𝜆1 − (1 − ?̅? 𝐾1
∗, 𝐾2
∗ )𝜋′ 𝐾1 +
𝜎𝐾𝐾2
∗ 𝜏1 − 𝜏2 
(𝐾𝑖
∗ + 𝐾2)
2 𝑃 𝐾1
∗, 𝐾2
∗, 𝐵1
∗, 𝐵2
∗, 𝑅1
∗, 𝑅2
∗ , (A.5) 
?̇?1 =  𝜌 + 𝛾 𝜇1 −  𝛾 + 𝑎 ?̅? 𝐾1
∗, 𝐾2
∗ + 𝑐𝑎𝑗?̅? 𝐾1
∗, 𝐾2
∗ 𝑣 , (A.6) 
analogous equations for 𝜆2 and 𝜇2 with indices 1 and 2 interchanged, and the condition 
𝜆1 + 𝜇1 = 1. Above the notation 𝑓
𝑣 𝑡  means 𝑓 𝑡 + 𝑣 . 
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We assume that the function  
𝐺 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2, 𝑅1, 𝑅2 
= (1 − ?̅? 𝐾1, 𝐾2 )(𝜋 𝐾1 + 𝜋 𝐾2 ) + ?̅? 𝐾1, 𝐾2 ( 𝛾 + 𝑎  𝐵1 + 𝐵2 − 𝑎 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 ). 
is concave and strictly concave wrt. 𝐾1 and 𝐾2. We also assume that admissible solutions 
satisfy lim𝑡→∞ 𝜆𝑖𝐾𝑖𝐸  𝑡 = lim𝑡→∞ 𝜇𝑖𝐵𝑖𝐸  𝑡 = 0. The following result contains Proposition 
1.(ii). 
Proposition A.2: Consider FA. A policy  𝐷1, 𝑄1, 𝐷2, 𝑄2 ∈ 𝛤 maximizes the objective function 
in (A.1) if and only if 𝐾𝑖 = 𝐾𝑖
∗ and 𝐵𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖
∗ as defined above ((A.5) and (A.6)), for 𝑖 = 1,2. 
Assuming a steady-state solution, the numbers 𝐾𝑖
∗∗ = lim𝑡→∞ 𝐾𝑖
∗ 𝑡  satisfy  
(1 − ?̅? 𝐾1
∗∗, 𝐾2
∗∗ )𝜋′ 𝐾1
∗∗ 
=  𝜌 + 𝛿 (1 −
 𝛾 + 𝑎 1 − 𝑐𝑗 ?̅? 𝐾1
∗∗, 𝐾2
∗∗ 
𝜌 + 𝛾
) +
𝜎𝐾𝐾2
∗∗ 𝜏1 − 𝜏2 
 𝐾1
∗∗  + 𝐾2
∗∗ 2
𝑃∗ 𝐾1
∗∗, 𝐾2
∗∗ , 
(A.7) 
where  
𝑃∗ 𝐾1
∗∗, 𝐾2
∗∗ =  𝜋 𝐾1
∗∗ + 𝜋 𝐾2
∗∗ −
 𝛾 + 𝑎 + 𝑎𝑗 𝛿
𝛾
 𝐾1
∗∗ + 𝐾2
∗∗ . 
An analogous equation holds with indices 1 and 2 interchanged. 
Proof of Proposition A.2: Using a similar notation as in the proof of Proposition A.1 and 
assuming that 𝐾𝑖 = 𝐾𝑖
∗ and 𝐵𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖
∗ for 𝑖 = 1,2, the aim is to show that 
Δ ≔ ∫(?̃?1 − ?̃?1)𝐸
∞
0
𝑑𝑡 ≥ 0. 
The constraints of the problem imply 
?̃?1 − ?̃?1 = 𝐺 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2, 𝑅1, 𝑅2 − 𝐺 𝐾1′, 𝐾2′, 𝐵1′, 𝐵2′, 𝑅1′, 𝑅2′ − 𝜆𝑖 (∑?̇̃?𝑖 + 𝛿?̃?𝑖
2
𝑖=1
)
− 𝜇𝑖 (∑?̇̃?𝑖 + 𝛾?̃?𝑖
2
𝑖=1
). 
Since 𝐺 is assumed to be concave, we get, by writing 𝑥 =  𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2, 𝑅1, 𝑅2 , that 
𝐺 𝑥 − 𝐺 𝑥′ ≥ ∇𝐺 𝑥 𝑇 𝑥 − 𝑥′ 
= ?̃?1 ((1 − ?̅? 𝐾1, 𝐾2 )𝜋
′ 𝐾1 − 𝜎𝐾
 𝜏1 − 𝜏2 𝐾2
 𝐾1 + 𝐾2 2
𝑃 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2, 𝑅1, 𝑅2 )
+ ?̃?2 ((1 − ?̅? 𝐾1, 𝐾2 )𝜋
′ 𝐾2 − 𝜎𝐾
 𝜏2 − 𝜏1 𝐾1
 𝐾1 + 𝐾2 2
𝑃 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2, 𝑅1, 𝑅2 )
+ (?̃?1 + ?̃?2) 𝛾 + 𝑎 ?̅? 𝐾1, 𝐾2 −  ?̃?1 + ?̃?2 𝑎𝑗?̅? 𝐾1, 𝐾2 . 
Integrating and applying a change of variables as in (A.4), yields the lower estimate 
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Δ ≥ ∫ (?̃?1 ((1 − ?̅? 𝐾1, 𝐾2 )𝜋
′ 𝐾1 − 𝜎𝐾
 𝜏1 − 𝜏2 𝐾2
 𝐾1 + 𝐾2 2
𝑃 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2, 𝑅1, 𝑅2 )
∞
0
+ ?̃?2 ((1 − ?̅? 𝐾1, 𝐾2 )𝜋
′ 𝐾2 − 𝜎𝐾
 𝜏2 − 𝜏1 𝐾1
 𝐾1 + 𝐾2 2
𝑃 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2, 𝑅1, 𝑅2 )
+ (?̃?1 + ?̃?2)[ 𝛾 + 𝑎 ?̅? 𝐾1, 𝐾2 − 𝑐𝑎𝑗?̅? 𝐾1, 𝐾2 
𝑣])𝐸 𝑑𝑡. 
Using the definitions of 𝜆𝑖 and 𝜇𝑖, this yields 
Δ ≥ ∫ (∑?̃?𝑖(𝜌𝜆𝑖 − ?̇?𝑖)
2
𝑖=1
− 𝜆𝑖?̇̃?𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖 𝜌𝜇𝑖 − ?̇?𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖 ?̇̃?𝑖)𝐸
∞
0
𝑑𝑡 = ∑−∫(𝜆𝑖?̃?𝑖𝐸)′
∞
0
𝑑𝑡 − ∫(𝜇𝑖?̃?𝑖𝐸)′
∞
0
𝑑𝑡
2
𝑖=1
= 0, 
which shows that 𝐾𝑖 and 𝐵𝑖 are optimal. The uniqueness of the solutions 𝐾𝑖 = 𝐾𝑖
∗ and 
𝐵𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖
∗ (𝑖 = 1,2  (i.e. the strict inequality Δ > 0) is proved similarly as in the proof of 
Proposition A.1 using the continuity of 𝐾𝑖 and the strict concavity of 𝐺 with respect to 𝐾𝑖. 
Equations (A.5) and (A.6) and the fact 𝜆1 + 𝜇1 = 1 imply the relation 
?̇?1 (
𝛾 − 𝛿
𝜌 + 𝛾
) + (1 − ?̅? 𝐾1, 𝐾2 )𝜋
′ 𝐾1 
=  𝜌 + 𝛿 (1 −
 𝛾 + 𝑎 ?̅? 𝐾1, 𝐾2 − 𝑐𝑎𝑗?̅? 𝐾1, 𝐾2 
𝑣
𝜌 + 𝛾
)
+
𝜎𝐾𝐾2 𝜏1 − 𝜏2 
 𝐾1 + 𝐾2 2
𝑃 𝐾1, 𝐾2, 𝐵1, 𝐵2, 𝑅1, 𝑅2 . 
Assuming now a steady-state solution, where lim𝑡→∞ ?̇?𝑖 𝑡 = lim𝑡→∞ ?̇?𝑖 𝑡 = 0 and where 
lim𝑡→∞ 𝐾𝑖 𝑡 =:𝐾𝑖
∗∗ and lim𝑡→∞ 𝐵𝑖 𝑡 =:𝐵𝑖
∗∗ exist for 𝑖 = 1,2, we have lim𝑡→∞ ?̅? 𝐾1 𝑡 , 𝐾2 𝑡  
𝑣 =
?̅? 𝐾1
∗, 𝐾2
∗  and, solving from the state equations, lim𝑡→∞ 𝐵𝑖 𝑡 =  𝛿/𝛾 𝐾𝑖
∗. The above relation 
now implies (A.7). 
 
Appendix B: Investment-Enhancing Effects of AGI (𝛾 > 𝛿; 𝜌; 𝑎 ≠ 𝜌; 𝑣  
Accelerated Fiscal Depreciation (𝛾 > 𝛿) 
In Table 1 we considered cases where the book value of the capital stock evolves exactly 
like the real value of the stock of capital. Let us next consider cases where we allow for 
the accelerated rate of fiscal depreciation to be higher than the rate of economic 
depreciation. The results are given in Table 3. 
The first column in Table 3 again shows the baseline case. In column 2 we consider a 
case which is otherwise like the baseline case, but where the accounting stock of capital 
depreciates at double the speed of the economic depreciation (𝛾 = 2 ∗ 𝛿). In this case, the 
cost of capital of the case with no allowance decreases from 0.0640 to 0.0576 and for the 
AGI from 0.0507 to 0.0500. Therefore, in the presence of accelerated depreciation, the 
introduction of the AGI reduces the cost of capital by 13.2%, which is less than without 
accelerated depreciation (20.8%). This follows, however, mostly from the reduction in the 
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cost of capital taking place in the case with no allowance. Compared to the ACE, two 
things are observed. First, the cost of capital in the AGI becomes extremely close to that 
for the ACE (with four-decimal accuracy they become indistinguishable from each other). 
Second, the cost of capital in the ACE is not affected by accelerated depreciation, 
whereas the investment incentives in the AGI depend on accelerated depreciation. 
Columns 3 and 4 consider accelerated depreciation in cases where the depreciation rate 
is lower than in columns 1 and 2. Again, accelerated depreciation mutes the increase in 
the investment incentive following from the AGI. The cost of capital in the ACE remains 
intact in this case also. 
Table 3. Cost of Capital: Accelerated Fiscal Depreciation 
Tax Parameters and Economic Parameters (1 BASE) (2) (3) (4) 
  Corporate Tax Rate in Country 1 𝜏1 0.219 0.219 0.219 0.219 
  Corporate Tax Rate in Country 2 𝜏2 0.219 0.219 0.219 0.219 
  Rate of Economic Depreciation δ  0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 
  Rate of Fiscal Depreciation γ  0.25 0.50 0.05 0.10 
  Discount Rate 𝜌 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
  AGI Rate a 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
  Duration of Investment in AGI v 10 10 10 10 
Cost of Capital     
  FA, No Equity Allowance 0.0640  0.0576  0.0640 0.0593 
  AGI 0.0507 0.0500  0.0552 0.0521 
  ACE 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 
 
In summary, the AGI and ACE decrease the cost of capital compared to the case with no 
allowance and with accelerated depreciation. However, the reductions are smaller in 
relative terms in the presence of accelerated depreciation than without it. However, the 
cost of capital in the ACE is neither affected by the differences in the depreciation rate 
nor by accelerated depreciation, whereas the cost of capital for both the AGI and the case 
with no allowance remain dependent on the parameter values. 
Discount Rate (𝜌) 
In Table 4 we study the investment incentives using varying discount rates. We observe 
that whereas for the case with no equity allowance the change in the discount rate seems 
to scale the cost of capital, for the ACE the cost of capital remains exactly at the level of 
the discount rate. For the AGI the cost of capital is neither a pure scaling nor a pure 
shift, but the discount rate affects the cost of capital non-linearly. Compared to the above 
cases the cost of capital in the ACE is no longer a constant, but depends on the discount 
rate. 
Table 4. Cost of Capital: AGI Rate 
Tax Parameters and Economic Parameters (1 BASE) (2) (3) (4) 
  Corporate Tax Rate in Country 1 𝜏1 0.219 0.219 0.219 0.219 
  Corporate Tax Rate in Country 2 𝜏2 0.219 0.219 0.219 0.219 
  Rate of Economic Depreciation δ  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
  Rate of Fiscal Depreciation γ  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
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  Discount Rate 𝜌  0.05 0.10 0.15 0.025 
  AGI Rate a 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.025 
  Duration of Investment in AGI v 10 10 10 10 
Cost of Capital     
  FA, No Equity Allowance 0.0640 0.1280 0.1921 0.0320 
  AGI 0.0507 0.1008  0.1508 0.0254 
  ACE 0.0500 0.1000 0.1500 0.0250 
 
AGI Rate (𝑎 ≠ 𝜌) 
Let us next consider how the AGI rate affects investment incentives. Table 5 shows the 
parameter specifications and the cost of capital calculations for the cases where we vary 
the AGI rate (𝑎), and in particular make it differ from the discount rate (𝜌). We first 
observe that now the cost of capital varies according to the parameter values in both the 
AGI and the ACE, but remains intact for the case with no equity allowance (as it does not 
depend on the AGI rate). Second, compared to the above cases where the AGI rate is 
aligned with the discount rate, now the cost of capital in the ACE differs from the 
discount rate. Third, we also observe that the higher AGI rate lowers the cost of capital 
for both the AGI and the ACE, and that the differences between the AGI and the ACE 
remain small. 
 
Table 5. Cost of Capital: AGI Rate 
Tax Parameters and Economic Parameters (1 BASE) (2) (3) (4) 
  Corporate Tax Rate in Country 1 𝜏1 0.219 0.219 0.219 0.219 
  Corporate Tax Rate in Country 2 𝜏2 0.219 0.219 0.219 0.219 
  Rate of Economic Depreciation δ  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
  Rate of Fiscal Depreciation γ  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
  Discount Rate 𝜌  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
  AGI Rate a 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.025 
  Duration of Investment in AGI v 10 10 10 10 
Cost of Capital     
  FA, No Equity Allowance 0.0640 0.0640 0.0640 0.0640 
  AGI 0.0507 0.0374  0.0241 0.0574 
  ACE 0.0500 0.0360 0.0220 0.0570 
 
AGI Base Accumulation Period (𝑣) 
A particularly interesting feature of the AGI is how its base accumulates. This is also the 
thing that makes the AGI differ from the ACE. In Table 6 we study how the duration of 
the AGI accumulation period affects the cost of capital in our three cases. Compared to 
the baseline case, where a new investment remains in the AGI base for the next 10 years, 
in columns 2-4 it remains in it for 3, 5 or 15 years respectively. The table shows that 
whereas the cost of capital in the case with no equity allowance and for the ACE remain 
constant, the cost of capital in the AGI decreases non-linearly and quite rapidly in the 
first accumulation years, while the later years seem to be much less important for the 
cost of capital. 
 26 
 
Table 6. Cost of Capital: AGI Base Accumulation Period 
Tax Parameters and Economic Parameters (1 BASE) (2) (3) (4) 
  Corporate Tax Rate in Country 1 𝜏1 0.219 0.219 0.219 0.219 
  Corporate Tax Rate in Country 2 𝜏2 0.219 0.219 0.219 0.219 
  Rate of Economic Depreciation δ  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
  Rate of Fiscal Depreciation γ  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
  Discount Rate 𝜌  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
  AGI Rate a 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
  Duration of Investment in AGI v 10 3 5 15 
Cost of Capital     
  FA, No Equity Allowance 0.0640 0.0640 0.0640 0.0640 
  AGI 0.0507 0.0557  0.0531 0.0502 
  ACE 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 
 
We study this issue in more detail in Figure 3, which focuses on how the cost of capital 
in the AGI depends on the number of years that are counted in for the AGI base. 
Motivated by Table 1, which showed the differences in the cost of capital with respect to 
the depreciation rate, 𝛿, we study this issue by considering in Figure 3 how the length of 
the accumulation period of the AGI base affects the cost of capital when the depreciation 
rates vary. Compared to Figure 2, where the depreciation rate is 0.25, in Figure 3 we 
consider lower rates ranging from 0.20 to 0.05. We find a similar pattern in each of the 
graphs in Figure 3: the cost of capital in the AGI coincides with that for the case with no 
equity allowance when 𝑎 = 0 and converges to that of the ACE as 𝑎 increases. The rate of 
the convergence depends on the depreciation rate. A higher depreciation rate is related to 
faster convergence. We also observe that with other than very low depreciation rates, the 
cost of capital in the AGI remains closer to that for the ACE than that of the case with no 
equity allowance, when the AGI base is based on a 10-year history. For the 10-year 
duration the cost of capital in the AGI is decreased by between 13.8% and 20.8% in 
Figures 2 and 3. For the ACE the decrease is 21.9% in each case. So the effects of the 
AGI seem to be quite close to those of the ACE, but do depend on the parameter values, 
unlike those of the ACE. 
Figure 3: Cost of Capital and Duration of Investment in AGI, varying depreciation rates 
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Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2 
Proposition 2: The optimal tax rate of country 1 in a symmetric tax competition model with 
the FA tax system and the AGI is determined by the following equation: 
𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼
1 − 𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼 = −
 2 − 𝜆 𝐾1
2𝜋′′ 𝐾1 
𝜋 𝐾1 − 𝜌𝐴1
 (A.8) 
For the case without an equity allowance, the ACE and the SA, the corresponding optimal 
tax rates are given by equations (A.9) – (A.11) 
𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝑛𝑜𝐸𝐴
1 − 𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝑛𝑜𝐸𝐴 = −
 2 − 𝜆 𝐾1
2𝜋′′ 𝐾1 
𝜋 𝐾1 
 
(A.9) 
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𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐶𝐸
1 − 𝜏1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐶𝐸 = −
 2 − 𝜆 𝐾1
2𝜋′′ 𝐾1 
𝜋 𝐾1 − 𝜌𝐾1
 (A.10) 
𝜏1
𝑆𝐴
1 − 𝜏1
𝑆𝐴 = −
 2 − 𝜆 𝜋 𝐾1 𝜋
′′ 𝐾1 
𝜋′ 𝐾1 2
 (A.11) 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
We first prove (A.8). The company chooses its capital levels 𝐾1 and 𝐾2 optimally by 
maximizing the net-of-tax profits. For FA with the AGI the net-of-tax profits for a 
company are  
П𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼 = [𝜋 𝐾1 + 𝜋 𝐾2 − 𝜌𝐾] − ?̅? [𝜋 𝐾1 + 𝜋 𝐾2 − 𝜌𝐴]⏟            
= 𝑃𝐹𝐴 𝐾1,𝐾2 
 
 
where ?̅? =
𝐾1
𝐾
𝜏1 +
𝐾2
𝐾
𝜏2,  𝐾 = 𝐾1 + 𝐾2 and 𝐴 = 𝐴1 + 𝐴1 with 𝐾 and 𝐴 being constants. Taking 
the derivative w.r.t 𝐾1 gives us the following condition 
𝜕П𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼
𝜕𝐾1
=  1 − ?̅? [𝜋′ 𝐾1 − 𝜋
′ 𝐾2 ] −
1
𝐾
 𝜏1 − 𝜏2 [𝜋 𝐾1 + 𝜋 𝐾2 − 𝜌𝐴] = 0  
Differentiating this optimal condition w.r.t. 𝜏1 and using the symmetry (𝜏1 = 𝜏2 = ?̅?,  
𝐾1 = 𝐾2 =
1
2
𝐾 and 𝐴1 = 𝐴2 =
1
2
𝐴) gives us the following equation (which will be used below): 
𝜕𝐾1
𝜕𝜏1
=
𝜋 𝐾1 − 𝜌𝐴1
 2 1 − 𝜏1 𝜋′′ 𝐾1 𝐾1
 (A.12) 
Next the country takes the company choices as given and chooses its tax rate by 
maximizing its welfare, where the welfare is now composed of tax revenue and the net-of-
tax revenue of the corporate group, with the latter being multiplied by 𝜆: 
𝑊1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼 = 𝑇1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼 + 𝜆𝛱𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼  
Here 𝑇1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼 = 𝜏1
𝐾1
𝐾
𝑃𝐹𝐴 𝐾1, 𝐾2 + 𝜏1
?̃?1
?̃?
𝑃𝐹𝐴(?̃?1, ?̃?2). Taking the derivative w.r.t. 𝜏1, using the 
symmetry (𝜏1 = 𝜏2, 𝐾1 = 𝐾2 = ?̃?1 = ?̃?2) and equation (A.12) gives us the following: 
𝜕𝑊1
𝐹𝐴,𝐴𝐺𝐼
𝜕𝜏1
=
𝜋 𝐾1 − 𝜌𝐴1
  1 − 𝜏1 𝜋′′ 𝐾1 𝐾1
2
[ 2 − 𝜆 𝜋′′ 𝐾1  1 − 𝜏1 𝐾1
2 + 𝜏1 𝜋 𝐾1 − 𝜌𝐴1 ] = 0 
 
 
As the first term is considered to be greater than zero, the condition implies that the term 
in the square bracket has to be zero in the optimum. Thus we get the expression in 
equations (A.8) and (17) in Proposition 2. 
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The result in equation (A.9) for the case without an equity allowance (noEA) follows from 
(A.8) by choosing the AGI rate to be zero (𝜌 = 0). The proof of the ACE result in (18) and 
(A.10) follows exactly the same steps as above, but replacing 𝐴 with 𝐾 in each step. 
For the SA tax system the proof of equation (20) and (A.11) also goes as above, but with 
an objective function 𝑊1
𝑆𝐴 = 𝑇1
𝑆𝐴 + 𝜆𝛱𝑆𝐴, where 𝑇1
𝑆𝐴 = 𝜏1𝜋 𝐾1 + 𝜏1𝜋(?̃?1) and 𝛱
𝑆𝐴 =
 1 − 𝜏1 𝜋 𝐾1 +  1 − 𝜏2 𝜋 𝐾2 − 𝜌𝐾. 
 
 
